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The laws of quantum mechanics allow for the distribution of a secret random key between two
parties. Here we analyse the security of a protocol for establishing a common secret key between N
parties (i.e. a conference key), using resource states with genuine N-partite entanglement. We com-
pare this protocol to conference key distribution via bipartite entanglement, regarding the required
resources, achievable secret key rates and threshold qubit error rates. Furthermore we discuss quan-
tum networks with bottlenecks for which our multipartite entanglement-based protocol can benefit
from network coding, while the bipartite protocol cannot. It is shown how this advantage leads to
a higher secret key rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Bg,03.67.Pp
In the quantum world, randomness and security are built-in properties [1–3]: two parties may establish a random
secret key by exploiting the no-cloning theorem [4], as in the BB84 protocol [5], or by using the monogamy of
entanglement [6], as in the Ekert protocol [7]. Several variations of these seminal protocols have been suggested [8–
12], and their security has been analysed in detail [13–19].
In the advent of quantum technologies, much effort is devoted to building quantum networks [20–25] and creating global
quantum states across them [26, 27]. Thus, the generalization of quantum key distribution (QKD) to multipartite
scenarios is topical. In order to establish a common secret key (the conference key) for N parties, one can follow
mainly two different paths: building up the multipartite key from bipartite QKD links (2QKD) [28], see Fig. 1(a), or
exploiting correlations of genuinely multipartite entangled states (NQKD) [29–32], see Fig. 1(b).
In this article we provide an information theoretic security analysis of NQKD, by generalising methods developed for
2QKD in [16, 33], and perform an analytical calculation of secret key rates. This enables us to quantitatively compare
the two approaches; we find that NQKD may outperform 2QKD, for example in networks with bottlenecks.
The article is structured as follows. In the Section I we introduce the NQKD protocol and its prepare-and-measure
variant, perform a detailed security analysis and the secret key rate calculation. In Section II we define the 2QKD
protocol, summarise the steps of the NQKD protocol in an implementation and calculate the secret key rate for the
example of a depolarised state. We explicitly model noise introduced by imperfect gates and channels in order to
compare the performance of the two different approaches. Quantum networks are discussed in Section III. The article
concludes with a discussion of the results.
I. MULTIPARTITE QKD: PROTOCOL AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
The entanglement-based Ekert protocol [7] can be generalised to N parties as follows, see also [31]. The parties
A and B1, B2, ..., BN−1 share an N -partite entangled state and perform local projective measurements. The best
performance in the ideal (noiseless) case is ensured if one requires that the measurement outcomes of all parties are
perfectly correlated for one set of local bases – which we can choose without loss of generality to be the Z-bases –
and occur with a uniform distribution. The only pure N -qubit quantum state that fulfils these requirements is the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [34]; however, for N ≥ 3, the existence of perfect correlations in one set
of bases forbids perfect correlations (even only pairwise) in any other bases, see Appendix A. We remark that other
protocols with less than perfectly correlated resource states are possible, but will introduce intrinsic errors [35].
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2(a)Establishing a conference key with bipartite
entanglement (2QKD).
(b)Establishing a conference key with multipartite
entanglement (NQKD).
FIG. 1. The setup for N -partite conference key distribution. Black disks are qubits and the black lines connecting them
indicate entanglement. Here, all quantum states are produced by Alice (A), who sends one subsystem to each of the other
parties Bi. Both protocols require additional classical communication which is sent via open but authenticated channels. The
grey background indicates the network infrastructure, i.e. the channels and nodes.
A. The protocol for N-party quantum conference key distribution
The protocol for N-party quantum conference key distribution (NQKD), with N ≥ 2, consists of the following basic
steps:
1) State preparation: The parties A and Bi, i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, share the N -qubit GHZ state
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉⊗N + |1〉⊗N) . (1)
2) Measurement: There are two types of measurements. First type: Party A and parties Bi measure their respective
qubits in the Z-basis. Second type: They measure randomly, with equal probability, in theX- or Y -basis. Similar
to the standard bipartite QKD protocol [36], the latter case is much less frequent. The parties know the type
of the measurement from a short pre-shared random key.
3) Parameter estimation: The parties announce the measurement bases and outcomes for the second type and
an equal number of randomly chosen rounds of the first type. The announced data allows to estimate the
parameters QX and QZ , which determine the secret key rate, see below.
4) Classical post-processing: As in the bipartite protocol, error correction and privacy amplification is performed,
for the details see below.
Note that the state preparation in step 1) can be achieved by locally preparing the GHZ-state at Alice’s site and
sending qubits to the Bobs (see Fig. 1(b)), or any suitable sub-protocol that achieves the same task. We analyse the
distribution via quantum repeaters [26] and quantum network coding [27] below.
In the following section we briefly discuss prepare-and-measure variants of conference key distribution. Because the
security proof of the NQKD protocol is done in the entanglement-based picture, this description is not necessary for
understanding the rest of the paper.
B. N-party prepare-and-measure schemes
We now sketch two different prepare-and-measure schemes for conference key distribution.
1) Preparing and measuring single qubits: Single qubits are experimentally easier to prepare and to distribute than
entangled states. Thus, establishing a conference key for N parties by using single qubits is an interesting possibility,
which has been studied for the case N = 3 in [37].
The protocol proceeds in complete analogy to the case of N = 2, e.g. for BB84 [5]: Alice prepares randomly N − 1
copies of a state |φk〉, k = 1, ...4, taken from the set SBB84 = {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, with |±〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉± |1〉). She sends
3each party Bi, with i = 1, ..., N , one of the copies. Each party Bi measures in the Z- or X-basis. In the sifting step,
the N parties keep only those cases where all parties used the same basis, and thus establish a joint key.
We point out, however, that the secret key rate in this scenario decreases with increasing N , even for perfect channels
and measurements, and goes to zero for N →∞: an eavesdropper can eavesdrop on all N − 1 sent states at the same
time, i.e. she has to distinguish the four global states |φk >⊗(N−1), pairs of which have either overlap 0 or (1/
√
2)N−1,
i.e. the distinguishability increases with increasing N . In the limit of infinite N the four global states are orthogonal
and therefore perfectly distinguishable.
Thus, this prepare-and-measure-scheme is (for N ≥ 3) not equivalent to entanglement-based NQKD as described
in the present article.
2) Prepare-and-measure equivalent of NQKD: The entanglement-based protocol NQKD described above can be
formulated as a prepare-and-measure protocol, analogous to the six-state protocol [8]. Instead of producing the GHZ
state of Eq. (1) and measuring her qubit afterwards, Alice can directly produce the (N−1)-qubit projection of the GHZ
state according to her fictitious, random outcome. Thus, for the X-, Y - and Z-basis, the six different (N − 1)-qubit
states she distributes among the Bobs, are
|ψx,±〉 = 1√
2
(|00...0〉 ± |11...1〉),
|ψy,±〉 = 1√
2
(|00...0〉 ∓ i|11...1〉),
|ψz,0〉 =|00...0〉 and |ψz,1〉 = |11...1〉.
(2)
This protocol is equivalent to NQKD, because it reproduces the correlations between A, B1, ... BN−1. Note that the
six-state protocol is included as the special case N = 2. The described protocol uses (N − 1)-partite entanglement for
four of the sent states, which are, however, sent much less frequent than the two product states. This fact renders an
experimental implementation of our protocol more realistic than the entanglement-based description might suggest.
In the remainder of this article we use the equivalent entanglement-based description of the NQKD protocol.
C. Security analysis of the N-party quantum key distribution
The composable security definition of the bipartite scenario [16, 17] can be generalised in an analogous way to the
N -partite case. Our security analysis proceeds along analogous lines as the bipartite case in [33]. See Appendix B for
explicit details of these generalisations. By employing this security definition and using one-way communication only,
we prove secrecy of the key under the most general eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics,
so-called coherent attacks [38, 39], independent of the context in which the key is used.
In the asymptotic limit, i.e. for infinitely many rounds, the secret fraction r∞, i.e. the ratio of secret bits and the
number of shared states (without parameter estimation rounds), is given by
r∞ = sup
U←K
inf
σA{Bi}∈Γ
[S(U |E)− max
i∈{1,...N−1}
H(U |Ki)], (3)
where U ← K denotes a bitwise preprocessing channel on Alice’s raw key bit K, S(U |E) is the conditional von-
Neumann entropy of the (classical) key variable, given the state of Eve’s system E, H(U |Ki) is the conditional
Shannon entropy of U given Ki, which is Bi’s guess of K, and Γ is the set of all density matrices σA{Bi} of Alice and
the Bobs which are consistent with the parameter estimation. The secret key rate is
R = r∞Rrep, (4)
where the repetition rate Rrep =
1
trep
is given by the time trep that one round (steps 1 and 2) takes. For now we set
trep = 1. The secret key rate in Eq. (4) as a figure of merit does not directly account for the amount of needed local
randomness, classical communication, qubits and gates. Depending on the context one might want to incorporate
one or more of the former quantities into a cost-performance ratio as a figure of merit [40].
Note that we have not assumed any symmetry about the quality of the channels connecting A and Bi. Therefore, the
worst-case information leakage in the error correction step is determined by the noisiest channel, see the maximisation
in the last term of Eq. (3). This is the main difference with respect to the bipartite case.
4D. The secret key rate
We now derive an analytical formula for the multipartite secret key rate based on a variant of the method of
depolarisation [33]. In practice, the described depolarisation operations will be applied to the classical data only, as
described in detail below. Readers who are not interested in the technical details can skip to Eq. (23).
Let us denote the GHZ basis of N qubits as follows:
|ψ±j 〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|j〉 ± |1〉|j¯〉) , (5)
where j takes the values 0, ..., 2N−1 − 1 in binary notation, and j¯ denotes the binary negation of j; i.e. for example if
j = 01101 then j¯ = 10010.
Remember that any state of N qubits can be depolarised to a state which is diagonal in the GHZ basis by a sequence
of local operations [41, 42]. In our protocol we introduce the following extended depolarisation procedure. The set of
depolarisation operators is
D = {X⊗N} ∪ {ZAZBj |1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1} ∪ {Rk|1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1}, (6)
where X and Z are Pauli operators and
Rk = diag(1, i)A ⊗ diag(1,−i)Bk . (7)
The parties apply each of these operators with probability 1/2 or 1 else. The operators from the first two sets of
Eq. (6) make the density matrix GHZ diagonal as in [41, 42]. We denote the coefficient in front of
∣∣ψσj 〉 〈ψσj ∣∣ by λσj
with σ ∈ {+,−} and j ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2N−1 − 1}. The effect of Rk is
Rk|ψσj 〉 =
{ |ψσj 〉 if j(k) = 0
−i|ψ−σj 〉 if j(k) = 1
, (8)
so applying this operator with probability 12 transforms
λσj −→
{
λσj if j
(k) = 0
1
2 (λ
−σ
j + λ
σ
j ) if j
(k) = 1
, (9)
where j(k) denotes the kth bit of the string j. As this operation is applied for all k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, it achieves that
λ+j = λ
−
j for all j > 0. (10)
The resulting depolarised state reads
ρdep = λ
+
0
∣∣ψ+0 〉 〈ψ+0 ∣∣+ λ−0 ∣∣ψ−0 〉 〈ψ−0 ∣∣+ 2N−1−1∑
j=1
λj(
∣∣ψ+j 〉 〈ψ+j ∣∣+ ∣∣ψ−j 〉 〈ψ−j ∣∣). (11)
In our multipartite scenario we define the qubit error rate (QBER) QZ to be the probability that at least one Bob
obtains a different outcome than Alice in a Z-basis measurement. Note that this value is not the same as the bipartite
qubit error rate QABi , which is the probability that the Z-measurement outcome of Bi disagrees with the one of Alice.
QZ can be read directly from the structure of the depolarised state in Eq. (11) and is given by
QZ = 1− λ+0 − λ−0 . (12)
For simplicity we neglect the possibility of increasing the key rate by adding pre-processing noise, i.e. we set q = 0 in
the notation of [33] such that U = K. Because
S(K|E) =S(E|K)− S(E) +H(K)
and H(K|Ki) =H(Ki|K)−H(Ki) +H(K) (13)
the asymptotic secret fraction is
r∞ = S(E|K)− S(E)− max
1≤i≤N−1
(H(Ki|K)−H(Ki)). (14)
5Note that we did not need to include the infimum over Γ, see Eq. (3), here because, as we will see below, the
measurement statistics completely determine all relevant quantities in our protocol. The entropies involving the
classical random variable K are directly obtained from the measurement statistics in the parameter estimation phase.
They are given by
H(K|Ki) = h(QABi), (15)
with the binary Shannon entropy
h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (16)
and the bipartite error rate QABi , given by
QABi =
∑
j
j(i)=1
∑
σ=±
λσj
Eq. (10)
= 2
∑
j
j(i)=1
λj , (17)
where j(i) denotes the i-th bit of j and, because both outcomes are equiprobable,
H(Ki) = 1. (18)
Giving Eve the purification of Eq. (11), the von-Neumann entropies involving Eve’s system in Eq. (14) are given by
S(E|K) = 1
2
S(E|K = 0) + 1
2
S(E|K = 1)
= −
2N−1−1∑
i=0
(λ+i + λ
−
i ) log2(λ
+
i + λ
−
i )
Eq. (10)
= − (1−QZ) log2(1−QZ)− 2
2N−1−1∑
i=1
λi log2(λi)−QZ (19)
and
S(E) = S(
1
2
(σ0E + σ
1
E)) = −
∑
j,σ=±
λσj log2 λ
σ
j
Eq. (10)
= − λ+0 log2 λ+0 − λ−0 log2 λ−0 − 2
∑
j>0
λj log2 λj , (20)
i.e.
S(E|K)− S(E) =−QZ − (1−QZ) log2(1−QZ) + λ+0 log2 λ+0 + (1−QZ − λ+0 ) log2(1−QZ − λ+0 ). (21)
Now λ+0 and λ
−
0 can be obtained with the additional X
⊗N measurement in the parameter estimation, because
λ+0 + λ
−
0 = 1−QZ = tr
(
ρdep(|0〉 〈0|⊗N + |1〉 〈1|⊗N )
)
is known from the QBER and tr
(
ρdepX
⊗N) = ∑j(λ+j − λ−j ) =
λ+0 − λ−0 . In analogy to QZ we denote the probability that the X-measurement gives an unexpected result, i.e. one
that is incompatible with the noiseless state, by QX . Because 〈ψσj |X⊗N |ψσj 〉 = σ this leads to
QX =
1− 〈X⊗N 〉dep
2
, (22)
which can, as we will see in Section II B, be obtained from the measured data in the parameter estimation step. We
remark that QX is not the probability that at least one Bob gets a different X-measurement outcome than Alice, as
the outcomes are not correlated, see Appendix A.
Finally, inserting Eq. (21) into Eq. (14), and using Eq. (4), we arrive at the achievable secret key rate,
R =
(
1− QZ
2
−QX
)
log2
(
1− QZ
2
−QX
)
+
(
QX − QZ
2
)
log2
(
QX − QZ
2
)
+ (1−QZ)(1− log2(1−QZ))− h( max
1≤i≤N−1
QABi).
(23)
Note that the parameters in this equation are obtained from the measured data and will depend on the number of
parties N .
6II. IMPLEMENTATION AND NOISE
In this section we compare the multipartite-entanglement-based protocol (NQKD) as introduced above to a protocol
based on bipartite entanglement (2QKD), which we define in the following.
A. Conference key distribution with bipartite entangled quantum states (2QKD)
A suitable protocol to establish a secret joint key for N > 2 parties via bipartite entanglement proceeds as follows,
see Fig. 1(a): Party A shares a Bell state with each of the N − 1 parties Bi and establishes a (different) secret
bipartite key Si with each party Bi. For concreteness, we assume in our comparison that the six-state protocol [8]
is used. In general, the N − 1 channels may be different and thus have individual QBERs. Party A then defines a
new random key kc to be the conference key. She sends the encoded conference key ki = Si ⊕ kc to party Bi who
performs ki ⊕ Si = kc and thus regains the conference key.
A comparison of the performance of the bipartite versus the multipartite entanglement-based strategy for N parties is
subtle and has to consider various aspects, as different resources are needed: on one hand only bipartite entanglement
is needed for 2QKD, while multipartite entanglement is needed for NQKD. (Note, however, that the number of
necessary two-qubit gates for generation of the entangled states is in both cases N − 1.) On the other hand, the
number of resource qubits per round is 2(N − 1) for 2QKD, while only N qubits are needed for NQKD. Finally, the
2QKD protocol requires to transmit (N − 1) additional classical bits (the encoded conference key). Thus, each of
the two strategies has its own advantages. A quantitative comparison regarding imperfections in preparation and
transmission is discussed below.
B. Implementation of the NQKD protocol
We now describe how the depolarisation operations used in the security proof can effectively be implemented
classically by adjusting the protocol.
For key generation and the QZ estimation, the parties perform Z
⊗N -measurements. These are only affected by the
X⊗N depolarisation operator, which flips the outcomes of all parties. It can therefore be implemented on the classical
data. The other depolarisation operators are diagonal in the Z-basis and thus do not change the Z-measurement
outcome.
Let us call the parameter estimation rounds, in which the parties measure X⊗N (after depolarisation), estimation
rounds of the second type. How the depolarisation step affects the X⊗N -measurement is not so obvious and is
described in the following.
Note that the depolarisation operators X⊗N and ZAZBk , k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1 (see Eq. (6)), commute with the X⊗N -
measurement and thus these depolarisation operators do not have an effect in second type rounds. But
RkXAXBkR
†
k = (−YA)YBk (24)
i.e. applying the depolarisation operator Rk is equivalent to Bob k measuring in Y -basis. Also note that
Rk(−YA)XBkR†k = (−XA)YBk , (25)
so let κj be the number of Bobs measuring in Y -basis in the j-th round, then Alice measures in the basis
MA(κ) =

XA if κj mod 4 = 0
−YA if κj mod 4 = 1
−XA if κj mod 4 = 2
YA if κj mod 4 = 3
, (26)
where a minus sign corresponds to a flip of the measurement outcome. Note that this measurement rule for Alice
implies that always an even number of parties measures in Y -basis and that the outcome of the measurement is flipped
whenever it is not a multiple of four. Each party measures in X or Y basis with probability 1/2. Note that the rule
for MA described above means that only half of all possible combinations of these measurement bases are actually
measured. However, in practice the parties can measure X and Y independently with probability 1/2 and throw away
half of their data (where an odd number of parties has measured in Y -basis) and Alice still flips her measurement
outcome whenever the number of parties measuring in Y -basis was not a multiple of four. This is not a problem,
7because in the parameter estimation rounds each party announces its measurement setting and outcome. We thus
arrive at the implementation described initially. Let κ˜j be the number of parties measuring in Y -basis in run j, i.e.
κ˜j =
{
κj + 1 if Alice measured in Y -basis
κj else
, (27)
then
〈X⊗N 〉dep = lim
#exp→∞
1
#exp
#exp∑
j=1
f(κ˜j)
N∏
i=1
ai,j (28)
= lim
#exp→∞
n+ − n−
n+ + n−
, (29)
where #exp is the number of experiments in the second type rounds with even κ˜j , ai,j is the outcome of party i in
experiment j,
f(κ˜) =
 0 if κ˜j odd1 if κ˜j mod 4 = 0−1 else (30)
and
n± =
1
2
#exp± 1
2
#exp∑
j=1
f(κ˜)
N∏
i=1
ai,j . (31)
We remark that, in contrast to full tomography, the number of rounds needed to get sufficient statistics for estimating
〈X⊗N 〉dep does not increase with the number of parties N .
Let us summarise the steps of an implementation of the NQKD protocol:
1. Distribution of the state GHZ state |ψ+0 〉.
2. L ·h(pp) bits of pre-shared key are used to mark the second type rounds, where L is the total number of rounds
and pp is the probability for an X
⊗N -round. This amount of key suffices, because an L-bit binary string with
a 1 for each second type round can asymptotically be compressed to L · h(pp) bits.
3. In each second type round each party measures randomly in the X- or Y -basis.
4. In all other cases all parties measure in Z-direction.
5. Parameter estimation:
(a) Alice announces a randomly chosen small subset of size L · h(pp) of Z-measurement rounds, in which all
parties announce their Z-measurement results. From this data the QBER QZ and the individual QBER’s
QABi are estimated.
(b) The parties announce the measurement results of the second type rounds together with the chosen mea-
surement basis. Alice flips her outcome if the number of parties who measured in Y -basis is not a multiple
of four (see Eq. (30)). From the data where an even number of parties measured in Y -basis (including
zero), the parameter QX is calculated according to Eq. (29).
6. Alice announces which Z-measurement results all parties have to flip (the probability for each bit is 1/2). This
effectively implements the depolarisation with operator X⊗N .
7. Classical post-processing:
(a) Alice sends error correction information (for maxiQABi) to all Bobs, which perform the error correction.
(b) In privacy amplification the parties obtain the key by applying a two-universal hash function, which was
chosen randomly by Alice, to the error corrected data.
8. The achievable key rate is then given by Eq. (23).
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(a)Key rates (Eq. (37)) for N = 2, 3, ..., 8 (left to right) as a
function of the QBER QZ of a depolarised state (see Eq. (32)).
The dashed line corresponds to the limit N →∞.
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(b)Key rates for N = 2, 3, 4, ..., 8 parties (right to left) as a
function of the two-qubit gate failure probability fG.
FIG. 2. The secret key rate of the NQKD protocol as a function of the QBER (a) and the gate failure probability (b).
C. Example of depolarising noise
In this section we assume that ρAB1...BN−1 is a mixture of the GHZ-state and white noise, i.e. the parties share the
state
ρ = λ+0
∣∣ψ+0 〉 〈ψ+0 ∣∣+ 1− λ+02N − 1(1− ∣∣ψ+0 〉 〈ψ+0 ∣∣). (32)
Here all coefficients other than λ+0 are equal, i.e. λ
±
j = λ
−
0 = QZ/(2
N−2) for j = 1, ..., 2(N−1)−1 and λ+0 = 1−QZ 2
N−1
2N−2 .
The rate of unexpected results for the X⊗N -measurement is thus given by
QX =
2N−2
2N−1 − 1QZ . (33)
For the highly symmetric state of Eq. (32) the key rate is then a function of QZ and N only. The terms in Eq. (14)
are
QABi =
2N−1
2N − 2QZ , (34)
S(E|U) =− (1−QZ) log2(1−QZ)−QZ log2
2QZ
2N − 2 (35)
and S(E) =− (1−QZ 2
N − 1
2N − 2) log2(1−QZ
2N − 1
2N − 2)
− (2N − 1) QZ
2N − 2 log2(
QZ
2N − 2) (36)
and inserting them into Eq. (14) leads to the asymptotic secret key rate as function of Q = QZ and N , namely
R(Q,N) = 1 + h(Q)− h
(
Q
2N − 1
2N − 2
)
− h
(
Q
2N−1
2N − 2
)
+
(
log2(2
N−1 − 1)− 2
N − 1
2N − 2 log2(2
N − 1)
)
Q. (37)
This function is shown in Fig. 2(a). For N = 2 the key rate coincides with the one of the six-state protocol [8, 33],
namely
R(Q, 2) = 1− h
(
3
2
Q
)
− 3 log2 3
2
Q. (38)
9TABLE I. Threshold values of the multipartite entanglement based protocol (NQKD) without preprocessing noise for different
numbers of Parties N . The well-known bipartite case, i.e. N = 2, is also given for comparison. A non-zero secret key can be
distilled if the QBER is below the listed value.
N Threshold QBER
2 0.126193
3 0.209716
4 0.263087
5 0.295974
6 0.315562
7 0.326892
8 0.333296
9 0.336851
10 0.338799
N Threshold QBER
11 0.339855
12 0.340424
13 0.340728
14 0.340890
15 0.340976
16 0.341021
17 0.341045
...
∞ 0.341071
In the limit of large N the key rate simplifies to
R(Q,∞) = 1− h
(
Q
2
)
−Q. (39)
We also numerically determined the threshold values for the QBER, i.e. the value of Q until which a non-zero secret
key rate is achievable, for different numbers of parties N , see Table I. Note that for fixed Q the key rate increases
with the number of parties N . However, one might expect that in practice the QBER is not constant but increases
with increasing number of parties N (because the experimental creation of the N -partite GHZ state becomes more
demanding). This intuition is discussed quantitatively in the following section.
D. Noisy gates and channels
Let us compare the performance of NQKD and 2QKD when using imperfect two-qubit gates in the production
of the entangled resource states. We employ, for both 2QKD and NQKD, the model of depolarising noise, i.e. if a
two-qubit gate fails, which happens with probability fG, then the two processed qubits are traced out and replaced
by the completely mixed state.
When the GHZ resource state is produced in the network of Fig. 1(b), Alice starts with the state |+〉A|0〉⊗N−1 and
applies a controlled-NOT gate from A to each of the other qubits.
The secret key rate is shown in Fig. 2(b) as a function of the gate error rate fG. It captures the expectation that the
demands on the gates for producing an N -party GHZ state increase with the number of parties N . We mention that
the GHZ state could also be produced using a single multi-qubit gate, e.g. CX⊗(N−1) = |0〉 〈0|⊗1+ |1〉 〈1|⊗X⊗(N−1),
which is locally equivalent to the controlled-Phase gate, see e.g. [43]. The QBER caused by this gate is Q = fG2 .
Because the threshold Q increases with N (cf. Fig. 2(a)), so does the threshold gate failure probability in this case.
In addition to imperfect gates, noise might be introduced by the transmission channel. Consider, for example,
the situation when the qubit of each Bob is individually affected by a depolarising channel. Let the probability of
depolarisation be fC , then the QBER is
Q(fC) =
2N − 2
2N
(
1− (1− fC)N
)
(40)
and the key rate can be calculated according to Eq. (37).
III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION IN NETWORKS
We will now show that in quantum networks with constrained channel capacity and with quantum routers, employing
multipartite entanglement leads to a higher secret key rate than bipartite entanglement, when the gate quality is higher
than a threshold value.
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FIG. 3. This quantum network with a central router C, which is able to produce and entangle qubits, exemplifies a network
with a bottleneck. The GHZ-like resource state used in the multipartite entanglement QKD protocol, see Eq. (1), can be
distributed in a single use of the depicted network (i.e. each channel transmits a single qubit only) [27], while N − 1 uses of
the network are necessary in the 2QKD protocol.
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(a)Preparation noise, see Appendix D for details.
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(b)Transmission noise, see Eq. (40).
FIG. 4. For less noise than the shown threshold, i.e. in the blue area, NQKD leads to higher key rates than 2QKD in the
network of Fig. 3.
Beyond the simple network of Fig. 1, the GHZ resource state can be distributed in many different networks. Consider
a fixed but general network as given via a graph with vertices and directed edges. Let all channels have the same
transmission capacity (also called bandwidth), which is associated with the direction of the corresponding edge. For
the sake of a simple presentation, we assume that this transmission capacity is one qubit per second. Thus, the time
trep consumed in one round (steps 1 and 2 of the protocol) is proportional to the number of network uses in that
round. A generic network has some bottlenecks. In this case the difference between the NQKD and 2QKD protocol
becomes evident: Alice may send a single qubit in the NQKD scheme, while she has to transmit N − 1 qubits in the
2QKD case.
As an example consider the quantum network where all parties are connected to a single central router C, see Fig. 3.
Because C is not trusted we assume it to be in the control of Eve. In this network the channel from A to C constitutes
a bottleneck. Note, however, that this network can be much more economical than the one of Fig. 1 if the distance
between A and C is large. The 2QKD protocol needs N − 1 network uses, i.e. t(2QKD)rep = (N − 1) s, to distribute
the Bell pairs. In contrast to this the NQKD protocol can employ the quantum network coding [44–50] scheme of
reference [27] to distribute the GHZ state in a single network use, i.e. t
(NQKD)
rep = 1 s. See Appendix C for the explicit
calculation. Thus the key rate of the NQKD protocol is (N − 1) times larger than the one of the 2QKD protocol in
the ideal case (r∞ = 1).
When again using noisy two-qubit gates (the QBER calculation is analogous to the case of the network shown in
Fig 1(b) discussed above), the QBER for the NQKD protocol increases with N . These two effects lead to gate error
thresholds below which the NQKD protocol outperforms 2QKD, see Fig. 4(a). For a fixed number of parties N
there is a maximal gate error probability below which the NQKD protocol outperforms the bipartite approach in the
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quantum network of Fig. 3. For N = 3 already gate failure rates below 7.2 % imply that NQKD outperforms 2QKD.
More values are listed in the Appendix D.
The exact same behavior can be observed when considering noisy channels. In the ideal case NQKD outperforms
2QKD, while NQKD is more prone to channel noise. The resulting threshold noise levels are shown in Fig. 4(b).
We mention that the famous butterfly network [44] leads to a similar advantage, see Appendix E for details.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analysed a quantum conference key distribution (QKD) protocol for N parties which is based
on multipartite entangled resource states. We generalised the information theoretic security analysis of [16] to this
N -partite scenario. Using the depolarisation method we derived an analytical formula for the secret key rate as a
function of the quantum bit error rate (QBER). For a fixed QBER the secret key rate is found to increase with the
number of parties. Accordingly, the threshold QBER until which a non-zero secret key can be obtained increases with
the number of parties.
Furthermore, we presented an example where multipartite entanglement-based QKD outperforms the approach based
on bipartite QKD links. We found this advantage in networks with bottlenecks and showed that it holds above a
certain threshold gate quality which depends on the number of parties.
We expect more interesting insights from analysing further aspects of the multipartite entanglement-based QKD
protocol. Regarding implementations the secret key calculation of the protocol for finite numbers of rounds will be
beneficial. Various examples of network layouts and the link to network coding schemes will deserve more detailed
investigations.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Hendrych (Elsevier, 2006) pp. 381 – 454.
[3] D. Bruß, G. Erde´lyi, T. Meyer, T. Riege, and J. Rothe, ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 39, 6 (2007).
[4] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, Nature 299, 802 (1982).
[5] C. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing
, 175 (1984).
[6] V. Coffman, J. Kundu, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052306 (2000).
[7] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[8] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
[9] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 057902 (2002).
[10] L. Zhang, C. Silberhorn, and I. A. Walmsley, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 110504 (2008).
[11] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012).
[12] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140501 (2014).
[13] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/283/5410/2050.full.pdf.
[14] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[15] D. Mayers, J. ACM 48, 351 (2001).
[16] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Ph.D. thesis, PhD Thesis, 2005 (2005).
[17] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301
(2009).
[18] M. Tomamichel and A. Leverrier, ArXiv e-prints (2015), arXiv:1506.08458 [quant-ph].
[19] P. J. Coles, E. M. Metodiev, and N. Lutkenhaus, Nat Commun 7 (2016), supplementary information available for this
article at http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2016/160520/ncomms11712/suppinfo/ncomms11712 S1.html.
[20] A. Acin, J. I. Cirac, and M. Lewenstein, Nat Phys 3, 256 (2007).
[21] M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. Alle´aume, C. Barreiro, B. J, W. Boxleitner, T. Debuisschert, E. Diamanti, M. Dianati, J. F.
Dynes, S. Fasel, S. Fossier, M. Fu¨rst, J.-D. Gautier, O. Gay, N. Gisin, P. Grangier, A. Happe, Y. Hasani, M. Hentschel,
H. Hu¨bel, G. Humer, T. La¨nger, M. Legre´, R. Lieger, J. Lodewyck, T. Loru¨nser, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, A. Marhold, T. Matyus,
O. Maurhart, L. Monat, S. Nauerth, J.-B. Page, A. Poppe, E. Querasser, G. Ribordy, S. Robyr, L. Salvail, A. W. Sharpe,
A. J. Shields, D. Stucki, M. Suda, C. Tamas, T. Themel, R. T. Thew, Y. Thoma, A. Treiber, P. Trinkler, R. Tualle-Brouri,
F. Vannel, N. Walenta, H. Weier, H. Weinfurter, I. Wimberger, Z. L. Yuan, H. Zbinden, and A. Zeilinger, New Journal of
Physics 11, 075001 (2009).
[22] D. W. Leung, J. Oppenheim, and A. J. Winter, IEEE Trans. Information Theory 56, 3478 (2010).
[23] M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka,
K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa, Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai,
K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki, H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon,
12
A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields, S. Uchikoga, M. Legre´, S. Robyr, P. Trinkler, L. Monat, J.-B. Page, G. Ribordy,
A. Poppe, A. Allacher, O. Maurhart, T. La¨nger, M. Peev, and A. Zeilinger, Opt. Express 19, 10387 (2011).
[24] R. Van Meter, T. Satoh, T. D. Ladd, W. J. Munro, and K. Nemoto, Networking Science 3, 82 (2013).
[25] T. Satoh, K. Ishizaki, S. Nagayama, and R. Van Meter, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032302 (2016).
[26] M. Epping, H. Kampermann, and D. Bruß, New Journal of Physics 18, 053036 (2016).
[27] M. Epping, H. Kampermann, and D. Bruß, New Journal of Physics 18, 103052 (2016).
[28] S. K. Singh and R. Srikanth, eprint arXiv:quant-ph/0306118 (2003), quant-ph/0306118.
[29] A. Cabello, eprint arXiv:quant-ph/0009025 (2000), quant-ph/0009025.
[30] V. Scarani and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 65, 012311 (2001).
[31] K. Chen and H.-K. Lo, in Proceedings. International Symposium on Information Theory, 2005. ISIT 2005. (2005) pp.
1607–1611.
[32] Y. Fu, H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, and Z.-B. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 090501 (2015).
[33] R. Renner, N. Gisin, and B. Kraus, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012332 (2005).
[34] D. M. Greenberger, M. A. Horne, and A. Zeilinger, ArXiv e-prints (2007), arXiv:0712.0921 [quant-ph].
[35] C. Zhu, F. Xu, and C. Pei, Sci. Rep. 5, 17449 (2015).
[36] H.-K. Lo, H. Chau, and M. Ardehali, Journal of Cryptology 18, 133 (2005).
[37] R. Matsumoto, Phys. Rev. A 76, 062316 (2007).
[38] J. Cirac and N. Gisin, Physics Letters A 229, 1 (1997).
[39] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 59, 4238 (1999).
[40] S. Muralidharan, J. Kim, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, M. D. Lukin, and L. Jiang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 250501 (2014).
[41] W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and R. Tarrach, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3562 (1999).
[42] W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, M. Lewenstein, and D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. A 61, 062313 (2000).
[43] T. Liu, X.-Z. Cao, Q.-P. Su, S.-J. Xiong, and C.-P. Yang, Scientific Reports 6, 21562 EP (2016), article.
[44] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S. Y. Li, and R. W. Yeung, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor. 46, 1204 (2006).
[45] D. Leung, J. Oppenheim, and A. Winter, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 56, 3478 (2006).
[46] M. Hayashi, Phys. Rev. A 76, 040301 (2007).
[47] H. Kobayashi, F. Le Gall, H. Nishimura, and M. Ro¨tteler, ArXiv e-prints (2009), arXiv:0902.1299 [quant-ph].
[48] H. Kobayashi, F. Le Gall, H. Nishimura, and M. Ro¨tteler, ArXiv e-prints (2010), arXiv:1012.4583 [quant-ph].
[49] N. de Beaudrap and M. Ro¨tteler, ArXiv e-prints (2014), arXiv:1403.3533 [quant-ph].
[50] T. Satoh, K. Ishizaki, S. Nagayama, and R. Van Meter, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032302 (2016).
[51] B. Kraus, N. Gisin, and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005).
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge helpful discussions with Jan Bo¨rker and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus. This work was financially supported
by BMBF (network Q.com-Q) and ARL.
Appendix A: The resource state and its properties
In this section we derive the form of a pure quantum state that fulfils the requirements of perfect correlations for
one set of local measurement bases, with uniformly distributed random measurement outcomes. (These local bases
are used for the key generation.) We also prove properties of the resource state regarding correlations of measurement
outcomes in any other set of local bases.
A general normalized N -qubit state reads
|φ〉 =
1∑
i1,i2,...iN=0
ai1,i2,...iN |i1, i2, ...iN 〉 , (A1)
with complex coefficients ai1,i2,...iN that satisfy
∑1
i1,i2,...iN=0
|ai1,i2,...iN |2 = 1. To achieve perfect correlations, we can
assume without loss of generality that all parties measure in the Z-basis and get the same outcome, as the choice of
another local basis corresponds to a local rotation, and an opposite outcome could be flipped locally. The requirement
of perfect correlations in the Z-basis is only fulfilled by a quantum correlated state of the form
|φcorr〉 = a0,...,0|0, ..., 0〉+ a1,...,1|1, ..., 1〉 . (A2)
It turns out that this requirement of perfect correlations in one set of local bases forbids perfect correlations, even
only pairwise, in any other local bases, for all N ≥ 3.
Theorem 1. For N qubits, with N ≥ 3, the state |φcorr〉 = a0,...,0|0, ..., 0〉 + a1,...,1|1, ..., 1〉 leads to perfect classical
correlations between any number of parties, if and only if each of them measures in the Z-basis.
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Proof. Measuring in the Z-basis, perfect correlations follow trivially. For the reverse implication, let us denote the
direction of measurement for party i by the vector ~Mi, with components M
x
i ,M
y
i and M
z
i . An observableMij of two
parties i and j is given by
Mij = ( ~Mi · ~σ)⊗ ( ~Mj · ~σ) =
∑
α,β∈{x,y,z}
Mαi M
β
j σ
α
i ⊗ σβj , (A3)
where ~σ denotes the vector of Pauli matrices and the identity operators for the parties 6= i, j are omitted. Observe
that
〈φcorr|σαi ⊗ σβj |φcorr〉 = 0 unless α = β = z, (A4)
because all other combinations of Pauli operators change |φcorr〉 to an orthogonal state.
Denoting by pαi (±) the probability that party i finds eigenvalue ±1 when measuring σα, we also have 〈φcorr|σαi ⊗
σβj |φcorr〉 = 2[pαi (+)pβj (+) + pαi (−)pβj (−)]− 1, and thus pαi (+)pβj (+) + pαi (−)pβj (−) 6= 1, unless α = β = z. Therefore,
perfect correlations between two parties are not possible in any other than the Z-basis. This also excludes perfect
correlations between any other number of parties. - Note that the above argument, in particular Eq. (A4), does not
hold for N = 2, which is special.
Thus, any state of the form (A2) contains the resource of perfect multipartite correlations in the local Z-bases. In
order to ensure uniformity of the outcome, i.e. randomness of the resulting secure bit string, we choose for the key
generation protocol |a0,...,0| = 1/
√
2 = |a1,...,1|, i.e. the unique perfect resource is a GHZ state [34].
Appendix B: Security analysis of the NQKD protocol
In this appendix we generalise the composable security definition of the bipartite scenario [16, 17] to the N -partite
case. As mentioned in the main text, the security analysis proceeds along analogous lines as the bipartite case in
[33, 51]. We assume that the parties A and Bi, for i = 1, ..., N − 1 share n multipartite states. The eavesdropper E
is supposed to hold a purification of the global state. The total quantum state after Z-measurement of A and all Bi
is described by the density operator
ρnKK1...KN−1E =
∑
x,x1,...,xN−1
PKK1...KN−1(x,x1, ...,xN−1)
|x〉 〈x| ⊗
N−1⊗
i=1
|xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ ρx,x1,...xN−1E ,
(B1)
where x and xi describe the classical strings of parties A and Bi, respectively. Note that the classical post-processing
is identical to the bipartite case: In an error correction step the parties transform their only partially correlated
raw data into a fully correlated shorter string. Party A pre-processes her random string K according to the channel
U ← K and sends classical error correction information W to parties Bi, who compute their respective guesses Ui
for U from Ki and W. The error correction information W is the same for all Bobs, thus there is no additional
information leakage compared to the bipartite case. In a second step, the privacy amplification, Party A randomly
chooses f from a two-universal family of hash functions, computes her key SA = f(U) and sends the description of f
to all parties Bi who also perform the privacy amplification to arrive at their respective keys SBi = f(Ui). The total
quantum state will then be denoted as ρSASB1 ...SBN−1E‘. The key tuple (SA,SB1 , ...,SBN−1) is called -secure, if it
is -close to the ideal state, i.e. if
δ(ρSASB1 ...SBN−1E‘, ρSS...S ⊗ ρE‘) ≤  , (B2)
where δ(ρ, σ) = tr|ρ− σ|/2 denotes the trace distance.
Note that we have not assumed any symmetry about the quality of the channels connecting A and Bi. The
information leaking to the eavesdropper in the error correction step is determined by the amount of error correction
information which the Bob with the noisiest channel requires. This is the main difference with respect to the bipartite
case.
Therefore we arrive at the following key length `(n), generated from n multipartite entangled states, in analogy to
[33, 51]:
`(n) = sup
U←K
[S2(UE)− S0(E)− max
i∈{1,...N−1}
H0(U|Ki)] , (B3)
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where the smooth Re´nyi entropy Sα is defined as
Sα(ρ) =
1
1− α log2( infσ∈B(ρ) tr(σ
α)), (B4)
which for α ∈ {0,∞} is to be understood as Sα(ρ) = limβ→α Sβ(ρ). The infimum is to be taken over all states σ in a
ball with radius ε (w.r.t. the trace distance) around ρ, denoted as B(ρ). For a (classical) probability distribution P
the smooth Re´nyi entropy is
Hα(P ) =
1
1− α infQ
δ¯(Q,P )≤
log2(
∑
z
Q(z)α), (B5)
where the infimum is taken over all probability distributions -close to P in the sense of the statistical distance δ¯ (the
classical analogon of the trace distance). The conditional smooth Re´nyi entropy is
H0(PX |PY ) = max
y
H0(PX|Y=y). (B6)
Note that, differently to the bipartite case [33], the worst of the N − 1 channels influences the key length via the
maximal leakage to the eavesdropper in the error correction step, see the last term of Eq. (B3). In the following the
symbols K, Ki and U denote the single bit random variables corresponding to the respective bold-face strings. For
the limit n→∞ the secret fraction r is given by
r∞ = lim
n→∞
`(n)
n
= sup
U←K
inf
σA{Bi}∈Γ
[S(U |E)− max
i∈{1,...N−1}
H(U |Ki)] ,
(B7)
where S(U |E) is the conditional von Neumann entropy, H(U |K) is the conditional Shannon entropy and Γ is the set
of all density matrices of Alice and the Bobs which are consistent with the parameter estimation.
Appendix C: Details for the network coding example
Here we explicitly describe the distribution of the GHZ state in the network of Fig. 3. This is a special case
of the quantum network coding scheme which some of the authors described in [27]. Let |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
1. Alice produces two qubits C and A, each in the state |+〉. She then applies a controlled-Phase gate CZ =
|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ Z to produce the Bell state
| 〉CA = 1√
2
(|0+〉+ |1−〉). (C1)
2. Alice sends the qubit C to the router station.
3. The router produces (N − 1) qubits Bi, i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, in the state |+〉 and entangles each of them with the
qubit C using (N − 1) CZ gates. At this stage the total state is
|ψC〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + ...+〉+ |1− ...−〉) (C2)
=
1√
2
(|+〉C |GHZ ′〉+ |−〉CXB1 |GHZ ′〉), (C3)
where
|GHZ ′〉 = 1√
2
(|+ +...+〉+ | − −...−〉) (C4)
is the GHZ state in the X-basis.
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4. The router measures C in X basis. If the outcome is −1, i.e. |−〉C , then it applies XB1 . The state is now
|±〉C |GHZ ′〉.
5. The router now distributes the qubits B1, B2, ..., BN−1 to the corresponding parties.
Up to a local basis choice (Hadamard gate), the resource state of the main text has been distributed and the multi-
partite entanglement based quantum key distribution (NQKD) protocol can be performed.
To see that it is impossible to create N − 1 Bell pairs by sending a single qubit from Alice to the router, let us
group the router and all Bobs into a single party B. When Alice sends one qubit across the channel, the entropy of
entanglement EA|B ≤ 1. The N − 1 Bell pairs, however, have entropy of entanglement EA|B = N − 1, so they cannot
be created from the received state by local operations on B. Instead, N − 1 network uses are necessary and the key
rate decreases accordingly.
Appendix D: Gate error rates and the QBER
In this appendix we give details for the key rate calculations regarding the quantum networks of Figs. 1(b) and 3
with imperfect gates. We start with the simple network of Fig. 1(b). The GHZ resource state is prepared as follows.
Alice starts with the state |+〉A|0〉⊗N−1 and applies a controlled-Not gate from A to each of the other qubits, see
Fig. 5. When a controlled-Not gate acts on qubits i (control) and j (target) we denote it by
C
(i,j)
X = (|0〉 〈0|i ⊗ 1j + |1〉 〈1|i ⊗Xj)⊗ 1rest, (D1)
where X = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| is a Pauli matrix. We use a depolarizing noise model for the gate errors. The action of the
imperfect gate on the density matrix is
C
(i,j)
X,fG
(ρ) =(1− fG)C(i,j)X ρC(i,j)X + fG tri,j(ρ)⊗ 1ij (D2)
=(1− fG)C(i,j)X ρC(i,j)X +
∑
a,b∈σ
aibjρaibj , (D3)
where σ = {1, X, Y, Z} contains Pauli matrices.
It will be convenient to extend the notation of the GHZ basis to include the number of parties as a subscript, i.e.
|ψ±j,N 〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉1|j〉2...N ± |1〉1|j¯〉2...N ). (D4)
The initial state is
ρin =
∣∣ψ+0,1〉 〈ψ+0,1∣∣⊗ (|0〉 〈0|)⊗(N−1). (D5)
The first gate turns it into
ρ1,out = ((1− fG)
∣∣ψ+0,2〉 〈ψ+0,2∣∣+ fG14 )⊗ (|0〉 〈0|)⊗N−2, (D6)
the second into
ρ2,out =((1− fG)2
∣∣ψ+0,3〉 〈ψ+0,3∣∣
+(1− fG)fG 1
2
(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1
2
⊗ |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ 1
2
⊗ |1〉 〈1|)
+fG
1
8
)⊗ (|0〉 〈0|)⊗N−3, (D7)
FIG. 5. The GHZ state that is to be distributed across the network of Fig. 1(b) can be produced by Alice using controlled-Not
gates as depicted in this quantum circuit diagram.
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and the third into
ρ3,out =((1− fG)3
∣∣ψ+0,4〉 〈ψ+0,4∣∣
+ fG(1− fG)2 1
2
(
1
2
⊗ |00〉 〈00| ⊗ 1
2
+
1
2
⊗ |11〉 〈11| ⊗ 1
2
)
+ (1− fG)2fG 1
2
(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1
2
⊗ |00〉 〈00|+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ 1
2
⊗ |11〉 〈11|)
+ (1− fG)fG 1
2
(|0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1
4
⊗ |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ 1
4
⊗ |1〉 〈1|)
+ (2− fG)f2G
1
16
)⊗ (|0〉 〈0|)⊗N−4. (D8)
One may deduce the following observation. Let us denote the pattern of actual gate successes/failures as the binary
representation of an (N − 1)-bit number x, where a 0 at position i indicates the failure of gate i and 1 means the
corresponding gate was successful. The number of connected blocks of ones in the bit string x1 plus the number of
zeros, b(x1), is the number of subsets of parties that are correlated amongst each other. This gives the prefactor
cx =
{
1 if x = 11...1
2−b(x1) else
(D9)
in front of the corresponding term in ρ. These prefactors determine the overlap between |ψ±j,0〉〈ψ±j,0| and ρ, i.e. the
coefficients λ±0 (fG) of ρ in the GHZ basis. They read
λ+0 (fG) =
2N−1−1∑
x=0
cxf
N−1−|x|H
G (1− fG)|x|H
and λ−0 (fG) =λ
+
0 − (1− fG)N−1,
(D10)
where |x|H is the Hamming weight of x. After some combinatorics
∑
x c(x) for a given weight w = |x|H (unequal to
N − 1) can be expressed in a more compact form by summing over all possible “subset counts” β as
∑
x
|x|H=w
c(x) =
N∑
β=N−w
(
w
N − β
)(
N − w − 1
β −N + w
)
2−β , (D11)
which leads to the relevant coefficients in the GHZ basis,
λ−0 (fG) =
N−2∑
w=0
c′(w)fN−1−wG (1− fG)w
and λ+0 (fG) =(1− fG)N−1 + λ−0 (fG)
(D12)
with
c′(w) =
N∑
β=N−w
(
w
N − β
)(
N − w − 1
β −N + w
)
2−β . (D13)
From Eq. (D12) one obtains the QBER using Eq. (12). We show it in Fig. 6. The secret key rate is calculated using
Eq. (23) with
QABi =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=1
1
2
(1− (1− fG)k) (D14)
=
(1− fG)N + fGN − 1
2fG(N − 1) , (D15)
which is the average QABi for one to N − 1 gates, because we use a random order of the gates. This effectively mixes
all λ±j with j of same Hamming weight and accomplishes that all QABi are equal. Compared to a fixed gate order it
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FIG. 6. The QBER as a function of fG for the circuits described in the text, with N = 2, 3, 4, ..., 8 (bottom to top).
TABLE II. The multipartite entanglement based QKD protocol is more prone to gate errors, but requires Alice to send one
qubit only. These two competing effects lead to a threshold value of the gate error probability fG below which it outperforms
the bipartite approach.
N NQKD-threshold for fG
3 0.0725754
4 0.0689939
5 0.0618163
6 0.0553032
7 0.0498258
8 0.0452567
9 0.0414201
10 0.0381659
N NQKD-threshold for fG
11 0.0353766
12 0.0329621
13 0.0308531
14 0.0289959
15 0.0273484
16 0.0258773
17 0.024556
18 0.0233626
improves the key rate and removes the maximum in Eq. (23).
In the case of the network shown in Fig. 3, N − 1 gates are performed at C and one additional gate is performed at
A. The initial state at C depends on whether the gate of A was successful, i.e. it is
ρin,QNC =(1− fG)ρin + fG1
2
⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗(N−1) (D16)
=(1− fG)ρin + fG 1
2
(ρin + Z1ρinZ1), (D17)
i.e.
λ+0,QNC(fG) =(1− fG)λ+0 (fG) +
fG
2
(λ+0 (fG) + λ
−
0 (fG)) (D18)
λ−0,QNC(fG) =(1− fG)λ−0 (fG) +
fG
2
(λ+0 (fG) + λ
−
0 (fG)), (D19)
and the previous results can be used to obtain the key rate in this case. Note that while the final density matrix
depends on whether a router was used or not, the QBER (and QABi) does not, because the additional phase error
does not contribute to it.
For a fixed number of parties N there is a threshold gate error probability below which the NQKD protocol outperforms
the bipartite approach in the quantum network of Fig. 3. These values are listed in Table II.
The key rate as a function of N is shown for different values of the gate error rate fG in Fig. 7.
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FIG. 7. The secret key rate for the multipartite entanglement based (NQKD) protocol (solid lines) in the quantum network
shown in Fig. 3 as a function of the number of parties N for different values of the gate error probability fG = 0 %, 1 % and 5 %
(top to bottom). The key rate decreases with increasing N , because more imperfect gates are applied. The key rate of the
bipartite entanglement based (2QKD) protocol (dashed lines), plotted for the same values of fG, shows the 1/(N − 1) scaling
which is due to the bottleneck between A and C.
Appendix E: Key distribution in the butterfly network
(a)A (classical) linear network code (b)The corresponding quantum
network code produces two GHZ
states.
FIG. 8. A butterfly network. In the classical case (a) A can send bits a and b to both B1 and B2 by employing the linear
network code given by the transmitted symbols written onto the channels (⊕ means XOR). This implies that the corresponding
quantum network code produces two GHZ states (b), see Thm. 1 of [27].
We sketch how the NQKD protocol can be employed in the butterfly network shown in Fig. 8. As usual, the rate
constraints on the channels are one, i.e. each channel can send a single qubit per time step.
1. The quantum network code corresponding to the linear code shown in FIG. S8(a) is employed to produce two
GHZ states shared by A, B1 and B2 (FIG. S8(b)). See Thm. 1 of [27].
2. These two GHZ states allow to perform two rounds of the NQKD protocol in a single time step.
In contrast the bipartite entanglement based (2QKD) protocol (also in its prepare and measure formulation) can only
do a single round, because only two Bell pairs can be distributed (due to the outgoing capacity at A). Thus the key
rate of the NQKD protocol is twice as high as in the “standard approach”.
From the construction of this example it is clear how it generalizes: If the network allows A to multicast n bits, then
a single use of the corresponding quantum network will produce n GHZ states. Thus the NQKD protocol can be
performed n times per time step. However, the 2QKD protocol can only perform nN−1 rounds in the same time.
